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Kierkegaard discusses art in very different ways. He is frequently critical of it
and argues that it cannot represent life properly. Is he hostile towards art 
and the aesthetic—a Protestant who does not see much value in art? Bahr 
argued that, according to Kierkegaard, one must make a mutually exclusive 
choice between the aesthetic and the Christian faith, thus breaking the 
connection between art and religion (Bahr 1965: 198, 204). In the current 
literature on Kierkegaard, Pattison speaks of the “the negative implications 
of Kierkegaard’s work for aesthetics” (Pattison 1992: x). 
Despite these critical remarks on art, Kierkegaard does not reject art—
something that Pattison does recognize implicitly when he points out that 
Kierkegaard, in the context of the communication of the Christian message,
provides a Christian rhetoric. Moreover, Kierkegaard liked writing reviews of
literature and plays and was himself a great man of letters. In Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript (1846) Climacus remarks that the poetic must be 
maintained in life if human existence is to be genuinely human (CUP 1992: 
348). 
Primarily because of recent studies, there has been a revaluation of 
Kierkegaard’s view of art and the aesthetic. Gouwens’ study (1989) does not 
explicitly explore Kierkegaard’s relationship to art but contribute to this by 
pointing to the important place of the imagination in his thought. Walsh’s 
study, Living Poetically: Kierkegaard’s Existential Aesthetics and Erne’s
Lebenskunst: Aneignung Ästhetischer Erfahrung both appeared in 1994. They 
both argued, independently of each other, that Kierkegaard included the 
aesthetic in his religious ethical view of life. He borrows from Romantic 
aesthetics—which he for the rest criticizes—the view that life should be a 
work of art. His existential aesthetics is about “living poetically.” The 
question is: What is the place of art in this aesthetics?
As an alternative to Romantic aesthetics, Kierkegaard provides an
aesthetics from both the perspective of a ethical view of life and from the 
Christian perspective. The former is presented under a pseudonym so that it 
will be clear that it is not his own view. For the sake of brevity, we will speak 
of ethical and theological aesthetics, keeping in mind that Kierkegaard and 
his pseudonyms did not provide a full-fledged aesthetics but only occasional 
remarks on aesthetics. Unlike Erne (1994: 81-123), I thus distinguish
between the ethical aesthetics of the pseudonym B in Either/Or (1843) and 
Kierkegaard's theological aesthetics. “Ethical aesthetics” here means the 
view of life formulated in the ethical stage and “theological aesthetics” refers 
to aesthetics that emerges from Kierkegaard’s Christian view of life.
I will show that imagination and appropriation are core concepts in 
both forms of aesthetics but that  Kierkegaard’s view of radical 
transcendence—the qualitative distinction between God and human beings—
is the norm only for his theological aesthetics. We will first look at how 
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2Kierkegaard presents his existential aesthetics in his The Concept of Irony 
(1841) as an alternative to Romantic aesthetics. This view is developed 
further by B in the second part of Either/Or as an ethical aesthetics and by 
Kierkegaard himself as a theological aesthetics, primarily in his Practice in 
Christianity (1850). For reasons of space, I will limit myself to the works cited
with references to other works.2
Romantic Aesthetics and an Alternative  
In his dissertation, The Concept of Irony, the young Kierkegaard criticizes the 
Romantic aesthetics of poets and novelists like Schlegel, Thieck and Solger
who see reality as empty and meaningless. That view is expressed in the 
Romantic irony that entails “infinite, absolute negativity” (CI 1989: 271). In 
order to be able to survive and function in a meaningless world, the 
Romanticist creates a reality for himself, separate from the existing reality.
Irony now functioned as that for with nothing was established, 
as that which was finished with everything, and also as that which 
had the absolute power to do everything. If it allowed something to 
remain established, it knew that it had the power to destroy it, knew it 
at the very same moment it let it continue. If it posited something, it 
knew it had the authority to annul it, knew it at the very same 
moment it posited it. (CI: 275-76)
For this irony the Romanticists cited above relied on Fichte’s view of the 
creating I that can construct a world in an omnipotent way (CI: 273-74). 
Historical reality is thus reduced to possibility. In the reality created by the 
imagination itself everything is possible, with the result that people do not 
have to bear responsibility for it (CI: 279-82). In this way the Romantic writer 
sketches the requirement of the irony of “living poetically” (CI: 280). As an 
example of this sketch, Kierkegaard discusses Schlegel's novel Lucinde (CI: 
289-301).
Romantic aesthetics is an existential aesthetics: what is required is not 
only that the writer or poet makes his product but also that he himself lives 
poetically. Living poetically, therefore, is not only a matter of fiction but also 
something that is to be realized in everyday life. Thus, the main character in 
Schlegel’s Lucinde, Julius, is described as follows:
Just as his artistic ability developed and he was able to achieve with 
ease what he had been unable to accomplish with all his powers of 
exertion and hard work before, so too his life now came to be a work of 
art for him, imperceptibly, without his knowing how it happened. A 
light entered his soul: he saw and surveyed all the parts of his life and 
the structure of the whole clearly and truly because he stood at its 
center. (Schlegel 1971: 102)
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3Kierkegaard provides an alternative for this Romantic, existential aesthetics. 
He brings the illusory, possible reality back to the actual world and places 
living poetically within an ethical-religious or, more specifically, Christian 
framework. The ideal does not lie in the possible, in the imaginative world of 
the poet or artist, but in actual life. Living poetically should be something for 
every person, not only for the poet (CI: 325-326). The concept of humanity is 
decisive. The human being does not, as Romanticists believe, create himself 
but develops within a reality that is both gift and task:
[It] is indeed one thing to compose oneself poetically; it is something 
else to be composed poetically. The Christian lets himself be poetically 
composed, and in this respect a simple Christian lives far more 
poetically than many a brilliant intellectual. (CI: 280-81)
The Romantic view of art makes the world more beautiful than it is and 
attempts to reconcile the human being with existing reality by denying its 
imperfection. In that way the human being does not, according to 
Kierkegaard, become reconciled with the reality in which he lives but merely 
creates an illusory, better world. Infinity is placed outside human beings as 
an external infinity. According to Kierkegaard, the alternative is an ethical or 
Christian view of living poetically in which infinity is interiorized. He agrees 
with the Romantic view that “to live poetically, then, is to live infinitely” (CI: 
297) but replaces external infinity (the illusory world) with internal infinity.
The person who wants to enjoy infinitely poetically does indeed have 
an infinity before him, but it is an external infinity, because in my 
enjoying, I am continually outside myself in that other something. But 
an infinity such as that must cancel itself. Only when I in my enjoying
am not outside myself but am inside myself, only then is my 
enjoyment infinite, because it is inwardly infinite. (CI: 297).
We will see below what he understands by internal infinity. A genuine living 
poetically does not presuppose an aesthetic self but an ethical or religious
one. The Romantic irony that creates an illusory world and thus distances 
itself from daily life is replaced by the irony of the ethical human being who 
points to the movement of the infinite in the interiority of the human being 
who recognizes his absolute duty (CUP: 503). The ironist relativizes what 
makes the finite special in the light of the infinite ethical demand (CUP:
502v.).3
Ethical Aesthetics in Either/Or
From the Romantics Kierkegaard takes existential aesthetics as he outlined 
it in his The Concept of Irony and in the first part of Either/Or. But he 
changes its content in two ways: through the anonymous writer B in part 
two of Either/Or with an ethical aesthetics and by the theological aesthetics
of Kierkegaard himself. Here we are concerned with the former. Kierkegaard 
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4wrote Either/Or under the pseudonym Victor Eremita who had found A and 
B’s manuscripts in a secret drawer in an antique desk. In two letters B, the 
interpreter of the ethical view of life, argues against A the aesthete who had 
sketched Romantic aesthetics via the topic of love. B holds that the aesthetic 
comes to light better in the ethical view of life than in the Romantic view, 
according to which the aesthetic is an immediate sensual pleasure and 
sensual beauty. To get a good understanding of B’s ethical aesthetics, let us 
look first at his concept of humanity.
Being human rests on a choice, B writes to A. The aesthetic sphere of 
life does not contain a choice of any kind. The human being is “immediate,” 
as A had shown by the example of Don Juan who acts on the basis of his 
urges. The aesthetic human being can also be “reflexive,” as is apparent from 
John the Seducer’s diary which A had found.4 John attempts to seduce a girl 
with a clever plan whose goal is to conquer the girl rather than to start a 
permanent relationship with here. An actual self is lacking in both Don Juan 
and John because they lack the will to decide (SD1980: 29). According to B, 
the aesthete A wears a mask because he is nothing; he is constantly alone 
but in relationships with others (EOII: 159). Life is a fairy tale for A; he 
hovers above himself and his life is an expression of despair. B writes to A:
You continually hover above yourself, but the higher atmosphere, the 
more refined sublimate, into which you are vaporized, is the nothing of 
the despair, and you see down below you a multiplicity of subjects, 
insights, studies, and observations that nevertheless have no reality 
for you .... (EOII: 198)
To free himself from the aesthetic sphere of life A must make a choice. It is 
precisely by choosing despair that he is able to free himself from his despair
and choose a certain view of life such as what B means by the term eternal
validity: 
Choose despair, then, because despair itself is a choice, because one 
can doubt [tvivle] without choosing it, but one cannot despair [fortvivle] 
without choosing it. And in despairing a person chooses again, and 
what then does he choose? He chooses himself, not in his immediacy, 
not as this accidental individual but he chooses himself in his eternal 
validity. (EOII 211; italics mine)
  
Kierkegaard views the self of the human being as a synthesis in which the 
opposition of eternal and temporal, of infinite and finite, of necessity and 
freedom is maintained and concretized. This human structure should be 
realized substantively by every human being, be it ethically or religiously.5
Indeed, there is also an ethical shape to the human structure but this does 
not yet rest on a choice, as we saw. B thus distinguishes between the actual 
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5self and the ideal self (EOII: 259). How can we develop into the ideal self? It 
is in that connection that we encounter the concept “imagination” in 
Kierkegaard's writings. The term is a key term in Kierkegaard’s anthropology, 
even more important than feeling, knowing and willing. It is not merely a 
term having to do with artistic production—it is also the medium for 
developing the ideal self (Gouwens 1989: 205). In The Sickness unto Death 
this is stated as follows:
As a rule, imagination is the medium for the process of infinitizing; it is 
not a capacity, as are the others … it is the capacity instar omnium [for 
all capacities]. When all is said and done, whatever of feeling, knowing, 
and willing a person has depends upon what imagination he has, upon 
how that person reflects himself- that is upon imagination. (SD 30-31)
The ideal self that B forms in his imagination is the ethical self, which views 
life as a life of duty, of general moral rules. The most central point of this 
ethics is the call to realize within oneself the universal, most fundamental 
possibilities of being human.  “The person who views life ethically sees the 
universal, and the person who lives ethically expresses the universal in his 
life” (EOII: 256). B shows A that the aesthetic is served better in the ethical 
life than in the Romantic life of sensual pleasure in a dream world, as
sketched by A. A has to make a life choice, whereby the ethical is not denied 
but can be brought to clarity. He must therefore undergo a development by 
which the aesthetic is not destroyed but transfigured (EOII: 253). B 
demonstrates this by means of the themes of love and beauty.
B raises the aesthetic of romantic love to the level of marital love. The 
latter can ennoble the “first love” as described by A via a comedy by Scribe, 
by taking it up into a “higher, concentric immediacy” (EOII: 29) or,
formulated in a less Hegelian way, marriage is “the radiant transfiguration of 
the first love” (EOII: 31). 
The aesthetic is deepened in marriage by the fact that sensuality is 
linked with spirit, with a spiritual aspect in the love relationship (EOII: 60). 
For A, “infinity” was the momentary character of romantic love; for B,
“infinity” is the marriage relationship that has an “internal history” (EOII: 
134). In marriage the husband and wife enter into such a history (EOII: 96-
97). The evaluation of time and of repetition is thus different. The aesthete 
loathes repetition, which he finds boring, a matter of habit. He seeks change, 
like Don Juan or like the English tourist who is continually visiting different 
places. Or he limits himself to crop rotation on the same plot of ground—
through which the trivial becomes amusing. Here time is a series of “now”
moments, whereas in marriage time is reevaluated by preserving eternity in 
time (EOII: 138). There is mention of an (internal) history because a couple 
begins and maintains a long-lasting relationship together. There is thus a 
“movement” (EOII: 96), development and the posing of a goal, a term that, as 
we will see, is also important in connection with the beautiful.
In addition to imagination, one of the key terms in Kierkegaard’s 
aesthetics is appropriation. These obtain not only for the Christian faith
(EOII: 97) but also for life in general. B points out that predicates of love
such as faithfulness, steadiness, meekness, patience, etc. must be 
6appropriated by the individual inwardly (EOII139-40). They need to be 
repeated daily. In repetition reality is raised to an ideal and then the 
possibility is repeated in actual reality. Such a repetition makes use of the 
imagination to undo imbalances and diffidences in the human being himself 
(Gouwens 1989: 206). Marriage is thus sensual but at the same time 
spiritual, free but necessary, absolute in itself and as a moral duty pointing
to God (EOII: 62). B does not lose sight of the fact that the aesthetic has to 
do with beauty. He praises the beauty of marriage to which the sensual 
beauty of romantic love pales in comparison. Therefore, we must say more 
about how B views beauty.  
Like A, B describes beauty as teleology in itself. He does criticize A for 
not attributing any movement to this. “If there is to be any question of 
teleology, there must be a movement, for as soon as I think of a goal, I think 
of movement …” (EOII: 274). B connects beauty as internal teleology not so 
much with a material work of art as with human existence because it has 
movement in the sense of becoming-in-freedom (EOII: 274). B thus applies 
beauty to human life and uses marriage as an example of the beautiful life. 
He also calls marriage an internal harmony whose teleology is self-contained
(EOII: 62). Moreover, movement, an internal history, belongs to marriage. 
Here living poetically has to do with ethical existence. If the human being 
lives in an ethical way, beauty can be seen (EOII: 275). Marriage is the “truly 
poetic” (EOII: 96). 
What is aesthetically beautiful must not be confused with what is 
depicted as aesthetically beautiful in art. The question is if art can portray 
beauty properly. B has this depend on the view of life: if life is viewed 
ethically, then art falls short of being able to portray its beauty. Art is 
concerned with a concentration in the moment (EOII: 133). The problem is 
that art cannot do full justice to the time of the “internal history,” the 
“movement” (EOII: 134-37). And that is what precisely what belongs to 
beauty as internal teleology. The depiction does not work in music, which 
has the element of time, because it does not have any permanence. Poetry 
does the most justice to time, but poetry cannot express the succession of 
time either. B does hold that romantic love is portrayed well—after all, this 
love has to do with the moment—but that is not the case with respect to 
marital love which occurs anew every day. The aesthetic is thus
incommensurable with poetic depiction. But how is it then portrayed? B’s 
answer is: through being lived (EOII: 137). The depiction of the aesthetic 
happens here through people living it in actual life.
B thus presents to A an existential aesthetics of living poetically that is 
different from the Romantic one presented by A. For B as well, life is 
beautiful, but it is now viewed as beautiful from the ethical perspective 
(EOII: 271, 275). In Repetition (1843) Constantin confirms that life is 
beautiful because of repetition (R 1983:132). It is not the world that the 
Romantic poet himself has imagined that is beautiful but the actual reality of 
the human being, his marriage, his work and friendship—matters that to 
which the aesthete does not grant high priority. Imagination and 
appropriation are necessary to give form to such an existential aesthetics. 
7B presents an existential aesthetics that sees the ethical life as a work of art. 
The aesthetic is primarily a matter of life itself and seems to have less to do 
with art and poetry. We should thus provide a short explanation of the terms 
aesthetic and aesthetics. 
The term aesthetics (1) was first used by A.G. Baumgarten (1714-
1762) to indicate a separate philosophical discipline and referred not only to 
art, beauty in art or the experience of beauty in general but also to the whole 
area of sensory knowledge. The Greek term aesthesis means sensory 
perception or sensation. Thus, aesthetics includes both natural beauty as 
well as beauty in works of art.
A views the aesthetic literally as the immediately sensory or, more 
specifically, as sensual pleasure and beauty. He and Romanticism generally 
view aesthetics as existential aesthetics (2). B agrees with this view of the 
aesthetic as existential aesthetics but looks at it ethically. The aesthetic is 
not so much beauty in art as the ethically pure life. The material work of art 
does fall short with respect to the reproduction of the ethical life but is not 
rejected as such. This is apparent from yet another use of the term 
aesthetics. 
Aesthetics (3) as the study of the elements of style and articulation 
such as composition, design and transference. Both A and B opt for 
aesthetic form. In part 1 of Either/Or A uses different genres such as the 
aphorism, the essay and the diary by John the Seducer he found to 
demonstrate the Romantic aesthetic. B employs the literary genre of the 
letter, in which B as writer meets the aesthetic criteria that Kierkegaard had 
set for writers. In his From the Papers of One Still Living (1838), a review of 
Hans Christian Andersen’s Only a Fiddler, Kierkegaard had connected 
literature and ethics, demanding that a novelist have a certain education 
(Bildung) (EPW1990: 70-71) which the Romantic writer Andersen did not 
have. The novelist was also to have a view of life based on life choices, 
secular or religious in orientation (EPW: 73-74).6 B met both requirements as 
the writer of both letters to A.
In short, in Kierkegaard's writings the term aesthetics is used in two 
ways: as existential aesthetics (as Romantic, ethical aesthetics and, as we 
will see, also in the Christian sense) and as a study of the style and elements 
of expression.
Kierkegaard published Either/Or under a pseudonym. Kierkegaard used this 
technique as an indirect method of communication. He used aesthetic forms 
of literature, as a result of which it seemed as if he was an aesthetic or 
ethical writer whereas in fact he was a religious writer. He worked in this 
way because, as a teacher, he wanted to communicate on the student’s level. 
That is his indirect way of communicating (PV; CUP). He did publish 
religious writings like Christian Discourses (1848) under his own name and 
in them communicated “directly” with his readers.7
There are similarities between the ethical aesthetics of B and the 
theological aesthetics of Kierkegaard. Imagination and appropriation are 
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8important for both. Nevertheless, Kierkegaard did not share B’s existential 
aesthetics. The difference lay in their different views of life. B is the 
interpreter of the bourgeois individual’s existence of fulfilling the duties of 
society and choosing what is universally valid (EOII: 328). He lives the ideal 
of Kantian ethics, of the human being who must realize himself, although he 
does endorse the virtue ethics tradition in working out this Kantian ethics 
further. His own self is the goal for which he strives (EOII: 274). 
At the conclusion of Either/Or the qualitative difference between God 
and human beings is stated by the minister from Jutland. He uses the genre 
of the sermon and appeals to the reader to appropriate the truth: “only the 
truth that builds up is truth for you” (EOII: 354). We will see that this radical 
transcendence —or qualitative difference of— of God with respect to the 
human being proves to be the norm for Kierkegaard’s theological aesthetics, 
which distinguishes it from B’s ethical aesthetics. 
Theological Aesthetics
The ethical view of life views God as a legitimation of duty and its concept of 
humanity is that of ethical self-realization. A Christian view of life—
Christianity is not a doctrine but a communication of existence according to 
Kierkegaard—asserts radical transcendence, a radical difference between 
God and the human being, and holds that the ideal itself is not realized by 
the human being himself but is possible only through the imitation of Christ. 
There is no point of contact for faith such as B had in ethics (CUP 572-573).
For my thesis that radical transcendence is the norm for Kierkegaard’s 
theological ethics, I will first explore his view of the relationship between God 
and human beings and then show the consequences of this for his 
aesthetics.
There are gradations in the consciousness of the self. The human 
being is the measure for the “aesthetic and ethical selves” (SD: 79), whereas 
that is not so for the “theological self.” In his struggle for his identity, the 
young man in Repetition searches for an integration that cannot produce the 
ethical self (R: 228-29). We do not have the truth in ourselves. According to 
the Christian faith, “the eternal truth has comes into existence in time”
(CUP: 209). The human being receives a new quality in confrontation with 
the God-man, Christ: he is a sinner (CUP: 583-584). This poses the 
qualitative distinction between God and human beings (SD: 126). As 
Climacus writes in Philosophical Fragments:
But then my soul is also gripped with new amazement—indeed it is 
filled with adoration, for it certainly would have been odd if it had been 
a human poem. Presumably it could occur to a human being to poetize 
himself in the likeness of the god or the god in the likeness of himself, 
but not to poetize that the god poetized himself in the likeness of a 
human being (PF 1985: 36).
Here the ethical position, which is interested only in its own reality, is 
transcended (CUP: 288). This concerns the “theological self,” the self “directly 
9before God” (SD: 79). In faith the human being is based in God (SD 213). The 
human being is a sinner and must become a different person: “a person of a 
different quality …a new person” (PF: 18). A transformation is needed that 
gives the imagination a new ideal of the self and, indeed, eternal happiness
in relationship with God. The human being cannot realize that ideal himself
and opens himself up in an attitude of humility for the grace of forgiveness.
If the difference between God and human beings is infinite, if Christ 
has entered the world as the Absolute (PC 1991: 62), then in Christianity par 
excellence one encounters the contradiction of existence and thus, according 
to Kierkegaard, the comic. We already saw in the ethical position how irony 
is a category of life. Human existence viewed from the Christian perspective 
is (dark) comic—the (dark) comic is that which rests on a contradiction. 
Kierkegaard points in all kinds of situations to the humorous aspect of life
that depends on the contradiction in life. To give one arbitrary example, in 
part A of Either/Or the aesthete A gives a comic description of the human 
being that is a contradiction in the physical sense when moving in a forward
direction: 
The disproportion of my body is that my forelegs are too short. Like the 
hare from New Holland, I have very short forelegs but extremely long 
hind legs. Ordinarily, I sit very still; if I make a move, it is a 
tremendous leap, to the horror of all those to whom I am bound by the 
tender ties of kinship and friendship. (EO1: 38)
Here the inability to live in the present (the short forelegs of immediacy) and 
his compulsion to convert all life situations into reflection (long hind legs) is 
presented in a tragicomic way.
It is precisely in the Christian life that humor has a place (JP 2:1622; 
1681)—precisely because the contradiction between time and eternity, the 
finite and the infinite comes to expression most clearly in Christianity in the 
God-man (JP 2, 229): the God-man in a manger and the God-man on the 
cross. If one is open to it, then humor is found in the incognito of the human 
being who stands on the threshold of the Christian faith (CUP: 499-501).
The aesthetic of Kierkegaard’s authorship emerged in, among other 
things, Either/Or through the use of a pseudonym and the literary form he 
chose. He chose this indirect form of communication by adapting himself to 
the reading public that would not immediately choose his religious position. 
Kierkegaard considered himself to be a Christian man of letters (poet) but 
understood that he himself fell short with respect to being a Christian. That 
is why he used the pseudonym Anti-Climacus in The Sickness unto Death 
(1849) and Practice in Christianity (1850), with whom he himself had great 
affinity. The presentation there is also that of a man of letters because 
something is communicated that the author himself does not fulfill in his 
life.8
In the second part of Either/Or the issue is ethical communication, i.e. 
communicating a capability, an attitude to life. That is something other than 
communicating knowledge. Kierkegaard wrote in his diary that the 
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communication of knowledge is direct communication but that 
communication of a capability is indirect communication: “all 
communication of capability ... is indirect communication” (JP 1, 282). Here 
Kierkegaard does introduce a nuance with respect to the Christian faith. The 
communication of the Christian faith also has to do with a communication of 
an ability, but this is not completely indirect but “direct-indirect.” The 
Christian-religious communication, namely, presupposes in the first 
instance a direct, doctrinal communication, such as, for example, the 
revelatory datum that the human being is sinful. When such a revelatory 
datum is known, the direct communication changes into an indirect one
(JP:1, 288-89). On the one hand, it concerns a communication that comes 
entirely from without; on the other, it is a communication that expects a 
change in the person receiving it. That can happen only via a certain way of 
communicating. In Practice in Christianity the indirect communication is 
closely connected with Christology.
Christ the God-man, Anti-Climacus explains, is a contradictory sign. 
He is, to all appearances, an ordinary human being, but the contradiction
lies in the fact that he is God. Therefore, the God-man cannot communicate 
himself directly. 
We see that direct communication is an impossibility for the God-man, 
for inasmuch as he is the sign of contradiction he cannot 
communicate himself directly; to be a sign is already a term based on 
reflection, to say nothing of being the sign of contradiction. (PC 127,
142-43)
How can we understand the message that God took the form a servant out of 
love if that message could never occur in ourselves? The language of parable 
is necessary to see that. In Philosophical Fragments Climacus attempts to 
make the incomprehensible somewhat comprehensible by using a parable:
the story of a king who loves a poor girl and wrestles with the question of 
how the inequality between them can be removed so that he can win her for 
himself. The king removes his cloak and disguises himself as a beggar. 
Climacus does remark that this analogy is a disanalogy: God’s form as a 
servant is his true form and not simply clothing one can take off like the 
king can. (PF: 39)
The communication of Christ concerns a situation in which the 
teacher is more important than the teaching. Such a communication entails
reduplication. The communication does not happen by giving a theoretical 
explanation but by being reduplicated in the teacher because he exists in 
what he teaches. The message of the paradoxal unity of God and human 
being is reduplicated in the life of Christ, the communicator who announces 
that he is who he is. Reduplication concerns not only the teacher but also 
the student. The latter receives a communication without any objective 
guarantee of its truth and has to appropriate it in faith or reject it in 
irritation (Pattison1992: 90-91; ch. 3.). The communication summons one to 
act. It concerns the receiver appropriating the message existentially in his 
own acts in imitation of Christ.
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The content of the Christian message demands the form of indirect 
communication. That obtains for each new translation of it. Concerning this 
Anti-Climacus says that the communicator must erase himself and then 
postulate opposites as a unity. That leads to the double reflection of the 
communication. There is not merely a general communication to which 
people should or should not be related, but that which is communicated 
should be applied to oneself. Banter and seriousness, for example, can be 
combined in such a way that a dialectical knot arises that the reader must 
unravel himself (PC: 133). In that way the indirect communication can be 
called an art:
Wherever the subjective is of importance in knowledge, and 
appropriation is therefore the main point, communication is a work of 
art, it is doubly reflected. (CUP: 79)  
Apart from the indirect communication of the Christian message, radical 
transcendence is also the norm for the imagination. There is a limit to the 
imagination on the basis of the radical difference between God and the 
human being and the message of Christ as the God-man. We ourselves 
cannot conceive of the possibility that God offers people in Christ, as stated 
above. The relationship between possibility and reality has changed. New 
light is cast on the distinction discussed above between possibility (Romantic 
aesthetics) and reality (ethical aesthetics). In the ethical sphere reality is 
exalted to possibility as an ideal task, but in Christianity the possibility of 
God is higher than the reality of the human being, which is in fact despair if 
people realize that they are “nothing” in comparison with God.
At times the ingeniousness of the human imagination can extend to 
the point of creating possibility, but at last—that is, when it depends 
upon faith—then only this helps: that for God everything is possible.
(SD: 39)
I will remark in passing that there is a similarity between the aesthetic and 
religious spheres. In both the possibility is higher than the reality—in the 
first the possibility of fantasy and in the second that of God. Trusting in 
God’s possibility is trusting God in time. In the encounter with Christ reality 
is higher than the possibility one conceives of on one’s own; it is the reality of 
another person—that of Christ as a historical individual in time—who offers 
the new possibilities of grace. 
Although there is a limit to imagination, this does not entail that 
imagination is superfluous with respect to Christian faith. To the contrary, I 
already pointed to the use of the parable of the king and the girl to make the 
disanalogy between God and human beings somewhat comprehensible. 
Imagination must be used in service to appropriation, viewed as discipleship.
It must not only evoke a possibility but also stimulate those to whom it is 
directed to action. It has to do with the reception of the product of the 
imagination.
Response. As we read in Practice in Christianity, a child is given 
pictures of Napoleon and William Tell from a kiosk, as well as a picture of 
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the crucified Christ (PC:174-79). The child does not understand the latter 
very well. He is told that Christ was a person of love and rose from the dead. 
When the child becomes older, he will want to fight those who crucified 
Jesus, if they are still alive. And becoming still older, he will want to suffer 
like Christ. He thus appropriates the old picture from his childhood in this 
way. “If the sight of this abased one can so move a person, can it not so 
move you also?” (PC 178). Anti-Climacus sketches another scenario in which 
a youth has formed an image of perfection in his imagination (PC 186-96). It 
is an idealized image that has no connection with an existence full of 
struggle. The youth identifies with it. But can it be perfection if suffering has 
no place in it? Anti-Climacus holds that the imagination, including that of 
the artist, cannot properly depict a perfection characterized by suffering (PC 
187). 
As B already remarked in Either/Or, Anti-Climacus also decides 
something similar here on the depiction of life in art. The image lacks the 
“reality of time and temporality” of everyday life. The youth’s image of the 
idealized perfection does remain valid for him in a dialectical way because he 
gains an eye for another perfection that is characterized by suffering: 
In a certain sense the youth’s imagination has deceived him, but 
indeed, if he himself wills, it has not deceived him to his detriment, it 
has deceived him into the truth; by means of a deception it has, as it 
were, played him into God’s hand .... Then comes a moment when 
everything becomes clear to him; he understands that that hope 
belonged to youth, he understands now that suffering cannot be 
avoided .... (PC 190-91)
The youth must want to depict the perfection of everyday life. The original 
image of perfection, radically changed by the figure of Christ, should actually 
be realized by people in discipleship (PC 190). As Kierkegaard wrote in his 
journal, the task of the poet in this case is “not to poetize the ideal but to be 
like it” (JP 6, 6632).
In Christian Discourses Kierkegaard presents a scene in which 
someone sits by an altar on a certain day, looking at a painting of the 
suffering Christ. Then there is a moment in which everything changes for 
him, a moment “when the picture blessedly turns around, as it were, when 
you will say to yourself, ‘... He [Christ] has indeed emptied it, the cup of 
suffering, because what he suffered he suffered only once, but he is 
victorious eternally’” (CD 1997: 103). The truth must be appropriated and 
that obtains also for the imagined truth of the painting on the altar on which 
an angel gives Christ the cup of suffering (Luke 22:43). 
In the above examples of the child, the youth and the man or woman 
at the altar, the issue is constantly that of reception in the confrontation 
with the imagination. That is Kierkegaard’s theological contribution to
aesthetic response theory.
B used the concept of beauty for the ethical life; Anti-
Climacus/Kierkegaard does not do that in his theological aesthetics. The 
reason for this is, it seems to me, the central place of the cross which he 
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cannot associate with beauty, as is indirectly apparent from the first two 
examples cited.
Art in Existential Aesthetics
We may draw the following conclusions from the discussion above. The three 
key concepts in Kierkegaard’s view of art are imagination, appropriation 
(response), and radical transcendence. As a central anthropological category, 
imagination ensures the necessary condition that art is important regardless 
of the stage of life (aesthetic, ethical, theological). Kierkegaard is not an 
iconoclast; it is not the image that is at issue but the use that is made of it
(contra Pattison 1992: 155-88). Hermeneutically, the relationship between 
the work of art and the public has to do with appropriation, with response. 
Radical transcendence is the norm for the use of the imagination and art in 
the Christian religion and also determines the indirect communication by 
connecting it to Christology.
Kierkegaard employs the term aesthetics in a twofold way. He views 
aesthetics as existential aesthetics, which exists in different forms. The term 
“living poetically” receives its content in dependence on how life is viewed: 
Romantically, ethically or a Christian way. Although the term “living 
poetically” does not appear, as far as I know, in his works on religion, the 
matter itself is discussed: it concerns living poetically in a way characterized 
by living in discipleship to Jesus. Such a life entails religious suffering, by, 
among other things, dying to one’s own aesthetic immediacy, but joy about 
the grace predominates (CD part II). This existential aesthetics also includes 
irony and humor. He also uses the term aesthetics in the sense of reflection 
on aesthetic forms, the study of elements of style and expression, such as 
composition, design and transfer. The issue of literary design, the indirect 
method of communication is present in both ethical and theological 
aesthetics, albeit in the latter as direct-indirect communication.
Kierkegaard sees art as functional, thus rejecting the notion of art as 
contemplative pleasure without any relationship to an existing person (CUP: 
277). Material works of art serve life. Kierkegaard’s use of material works of 
art in service to the Christian faith is limited. That has an aesthetic and a 
theological reason. There is a limit to representation. According to B in 
Either/Or and according to Kierkegaard, art and literature cannot express 
the time factor properly. This view is now a subject of discussion. Time in 
music and time in poetry and the literary narrative have unmistakably 
something extra in comparison to the time of daily life (see Begbie (2000) and
Ricoeur (1984-1988)). Kierkegaard’s theology views the revelation in Christ 
so exclusively that there is little room for searching for other locations of 
revelation. Art’s only function is to serve the translation of the revelation in 
Christ. The view that art could be an independent dialogue partner for 
theology falls outside the perspective of this theological esthetics.
Bibliography
14
Bahr, H-E. (1965). Theologische Untersuchung der Kunst. München: 
Siebenstern Taschenbuch Verlag.
Begbie, J.S. (2000). Theology, Music and Time. Cambridge: University Press. 
Erne, P.T. (1994). Lebenskunst: Aneignung Ästhetischer Erfahrung. Kampen: 
Pharos.
Gouwens, D. (1989). Kierkegaard’s Dialectic of the Imagination. New York: 
Peter Lang.
Kierkegaard. S.
- Early Polemical Writings (1990) (1838). Ed. and trans. J. Watkin. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
- The Concept of Irony with Continual Reference to Socrates (1989) 
(1841). Ed. and Transl. H.V. Hong and E.V. Hong. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press (CI). 
- Either/Or  (1987) (1843). 2 vols. Ed. and trans. H.V. Hong & E.V. 
Hong. Princeton: Princeton University Press (EO).
- Fear and Trembling (1983) (1843) (published with Repetition). Ed. and 
trans. H.V. Hong and E.V. Hong. Princeton: Princeton University Press
(FT). 
- Repetition (1983) (1843) (published with Repetition). Ed. and trans.
H.V. Hong and E.V. Hong. Princeton: Princeton University Press (R).
- Philosophical Fragments (1985) (1844). Trans. D. Swenson (revised by 
H.V. Hong). Princeton: Princeton University Press (PF). 
- Concluding Unscientific Postscript (1992) (1846). Ed. and trans. H.V. 
Hong & E.V. Hong. Princeton: Princeton University Press (CUP). 
- Christian Discourses (1997) (1848). Ed. and trans. H.V. Hong and E.V. 
Hong. Princeton: Princeton University Press (CD).
- The Sickness unto Death (1980) (1849). Ed. and trans. H.V. Hong and 
E.V. Hong. Princeton: Princeton University Press (SD). 
- Practice in Christianity (1991) (1850). Ed. and trans. H.V. Hong and 
E.V. Hong. Princeton: Princeton University Press (PC). 
- Søren Kierkegaard’s Journals and Paper (1967-1978) 7 vols. Ed. and 
trans. H.V. Hong and E.V. Hong, assisted by G.Malantschuck. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press (JP). 
- The Humor of Kierkegaard: an Anthology (2004). Ed. and intr. T.C. 
Oden. Princeton: Princeton University Press (HK). 
Pattison, G. (1992).The Aesthetic and the Religious. London: Macmillan. 
Ricoeur, P. (1984-1988). Time and Narrative 1-3. Trans. K.Blamey and 
D.Pellauer. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.   
Schlegel, Fr. 1971 (2e ed. 1835) Lucinde and the Fragments. Trans. P. 
Firschow. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Walsh S. (1994). Living Poetically: Kierkegaards Existential Aesthetics.
Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania  State University Press.
Abstract
Primarily because of recent studies (Gouwens, Erne, Walsh), there has been 
a revaluation of Kierkegaard’s view of art and the aesthetic. This article
distinguishes between the ethical aesthetics of the pseudonym B in 
Either/Or (1843) and Kierkegaard's theological aesthetics. It will show that, 
while imagination and appropriation are core concepts in both forms of 
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aesthetics, that  Kierkegaard’s view of radical transcendence—the qualitative 
distinction between God and human beings—is the norm only for his 
theological aesthetics. As a central anthropological category, imagination
ensures the necessary condition that art is important regardless of the stage 
of life (aesthetic, ethical, religious). Kierkegaard is not an iconoclast; it is not 
the image that is at issue but the use to which it is put (contra Pattison). 
Hermeneutically, the relationship between the work of art and the public has 
to do with appropriation, with response. Radical transcendence is the norm 
for the use of the imagination and art in the Christian religion and also 
determines indirect communication by connecting it to Christology.
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